Note: This article originated as a paper in the doctoral seminar on the Gospel of John taught by Dr. Daniel Lendman at Ave Maria University in Florida.
The theme of faith in the Gospel of John is deceptive. It is more important than the written instances of Πίστ- (pist-) root words would show, since faith is that whereby one can receive the testimony of John the Apostle: “Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of the disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name” (John 20:30–31 RSVCE).1 Some may think that this faith and belief is simply a matter of trusting in the Lord.2 This essay, however, seeks to clarify the importance of faith as a matter of noetic content, though inclusive of personal trust, so the faith of this Gospel is better inculcated within the Faithful. Thus, the importance of faith for every individual is well summed up by then-Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger.
[F]aith regards the truth, by which I mean a kind of knowledge which does not concern the functioning of this or that particular thing, but the truth of our being itself. Thus, faith concerns what we must do to attain the rectitude of our being. These assertions also presuppose that this truth becomes accessible only in the act of faith and that faith is the gift of a new beginning for thought which it is not in our power either to set in existence or to replace. At the very same time, however, they take it for granted that, once accepted, this truth illuminates our whole being and, therefore, also appeals to our intellect and even solicits our understanding.3
Since the value of this Gospel rests upon its being believed in this way by the Church down through the ages, it may be surprising to hear that the term “faith” is only mentioned 102 times, including those passages where belief is constantly spoken of, in a gospel of 15,635 words in Greek!4
The English words “faith” or “belief” and their different grammatical forms translate Greek words using πιστ- (pist-) as their root. This root is descended from the verb πείθειν (peithein), meaning “to convince” or “to persuade.”5 In the Gospel of John there are four different words based on this root, πιστεύω (pisteuo), πιστικός (pistikos), πιστός (pistos), and ἄπιστος (apistos).6 It should be noted that πιστεύω (pisteuo) is, by far, the most common term in the Gospel of John at 99 occurrences, while the other three terms only appear one time each. Of these four terms, the former two words are etymologically based on the noun πίστις (pistis) and are, therefore, the main subject of this essay while the latter two are etymologically descended from the verb πείθειν (peithein).7 However, all of these terms are conceptually related since they all go back to the notion of trustworthiness — and, eventually, belief and faith.8 At first, however, this is merely a broad umbrella term — “trustworthiness” — where the precise object of faith is not clear. Is faith our trusting relationship to Christ, is this trust religious or human, does it require truth-content, does it require propositional truth-content, etc? Indeed, the language of the Gospel of John does indicate an answer to this question, which is beneficial for the Faithful’s self-understanding.
First, we should note that the concept of religious faith is not original to these πιστ- (pist-) root words.
The words in πιστ- did not become religious terms in classical Greek. It is true that faithfulness to a compact is a religious duty, and fidelity and piety are closely related. . . . But in no sense is πιστός used for the true religious relationship to God or for the basic religious attitude of man. Nor did πίστις become a religious term.9
And such applies to other cognates. Indeed, instead of using “trust” language with πιστ- (pist-) cognates to describe the fundamental religious attitude towards the Divine and a mode of worship, classical Greece preferred various different usage related to “trust” in general.10 “Whereas in the older Gk. world the idea that there are gods used to be expressed by νομίζειν.”11 Νομίζειν (nomizein) speaks to customary practices in various ways, but to nothing more.12 Something similar is seen in the Stoics’ usage of πίστις (pistis). “In the older Stoa the attitude of πίστις (= ‘trust’) befits the [wise] . . . πίστις acquires special significance in the sense of ‘reliability,’ ‘faithfulness,’ . . . πίστις is thus solidity of character.”13 The fundamental orientation of these cognates is about trustworthiness — not in this case about customs — even with a primarily internal orientation. Religiosity does not at first particularly matter. As time goes on, however, religious faith does become part of the common non-Christian usage — including “not just theoretical conviction but piety (εὐσέβεια) as well.”14 It should also be noted that faith is not particularly about truth content. While trust, character, etc. may be about how people verbally relate to one another, this is not necessitated by the concept of trust — and even less so by concepts like custom.
Religiosity in “faith” language is strengthened in the Old Testament, however, in the direction which is found in the Gospel of John and in Christianity. “As the OT understands it, faith is always man’s reaction to God’s primary action.”15 Thus, the relationship between man and God, caused by God’s own initiative, is the essence of faith. That God reveals Himself to humanity and reveals that He takes mankind into special supernatural relationship to Him is the object of Faith — First Truth and humanity’s relation thereto.16 This is not the only extension of these πιστ- (pist-) cognates, however. Additionally, there is “the living tension and polar dynamic of the OT relationship to God” rooted in both the fear of and trust of God.17 In the Old Testament, fear and trust of the Lord are spoken of more or less equally.18 What English translates as “trust” is found in the Hebrew text under several terms. However, πίστις/πιστεύειν (pistin/pisteuein) became the dominant Greek translation in the Septuagint version of the Old Testament.19 In a certain sense, this represents a positive narrowing of meaning in the Septuagint translation, as admitted by some scholars.20 Here in the Old Testament, while faith has become religious and has been narrowed — by the Hellenic times — to πιστ- (pist-) root words, this faith has not fully been understood as personal or propositional in the way it would later in history. “In the OT, however, this faith is essentially related to the history of the people, whose existence is grounded in God’s act and whose obedience God demands. Thus the individual is essentially the subj. of faith in so far as he is a member of the people; his faith is orientated to the future of the people.”21 As in the covenants given to Israel, faith was primarily about the tribes’ relation to God and only indirectly in the individuals.22 It exists in the individual less as a religious relationship between man and God and more as a legal conviction, i.e., obedience to the Law.23 This is not to say that there is no notion of a personal relationship of man to God in the Old Testament, but that the universality of this personal relationship as a matter of loving trust is not particularly clear. For example, while Abraham had a personal relationship to God, as Pope Francis has commented in his encyclical Lumen Fidei §8, as befitting the “Father of Faith” (see Rom. 4), is this because his personal relationship is supposed to be the same as Elea’zar son of Dodo’s (see 2 Sam. 23:9)? That Abraham’s personal relationship with God is of the same sort as his Israelite descendants is not clear precisely because Abraham’s special place as the “Father of Faith” is exemplar to Israel’s whole relationship to God. Whether any individual of the nation has such a direct relationship to God remains unclear. While the succeeding centuries and the coming of Christ would make it clear that the Faithful are indeed sons of the Father (see John 20:17) and friends of the Son (see John 15:15), this clarity had to be unfolded.
There is also propositional content in Old Testament faith, as seen in the Books of Moses or in the testimonies of the prophets. This content, however, does not often come to precise truth claims as in doctrines or in propositions about the Godhead — though there is great fideistic legal clarity — though as the history of the Old Testament unfolds, the seeds of such formal doctrines do become more and more clear, for example in the Book of Isaiah on the Godhead. “Thus says the Lord, the King of Israel and the Redeemer, the Lord of Hosts: ‘I am the first and the last; besides me there is no god’” (Is. 44:6 RSV-CE). Sadly, however, a greater contextual study on faith in Greek secular and Christian literature or in the Hebrew Scriptures would be too large for any one paper.24 Yet this short excursus serves to show how these πιστ- (pist-) terms gravitated through time to their meaning in the Gospel of John where both personal trust and propositional content are indicated by the term “faith.”
This tension between the older pagan sense of πιστ- (pist-) terms and of Christian/religious faith is still seen within the earliest data of the Church—the New Testament tradition.25
There are two primary options when it comes to understanding πιστεύω. One, shaped by tradition and the central role of creeds and doctrines within Christianity, assumes πιστεύω is primarily about propositional belief. . . . The alternative is to focus on πιστεύω as a relational term, conveying personal trust and commitment.26
Taking these two options as excluding each other, a focus on propositional belief regardless of some sort of personal relationship to the Incarnate Word or a focus on a personal relationship to the Incarnate Word which does not include the transmission of words or a human understanding of Him without the other, becomes reductionistic.27 It would certainly be ironic if the Divine Word did not convey words to men or that they, when understanding something of Christ’s revelation, would not understand this Divinely initiated personal trust with mental words, as is human nature’s wont.28
Scholarship on the Gospel of John shares many of the foregoing questions, for example, whether πιστ- (pist-) terms mean truly Christian faith in Revelation with the propositional connotations due to this deposit. For example,
Morgan notes the close connection of πιστεύω to Christology and focuses on the question of divine equality versus subordination. πιστεύω is based upon evidence, notably the signs. Yet the propositional elements are constantly framed as subordinated to the relational. . . . While the close connection of knowing and believing is acknowledged, Morgan reads most uses of γινώσκω as relational knowledge. In addition, Morgan places belief within a framework of pre-election, which also prioritises the relational over the propositional.29
Much of this favors a classical understanding of Christian faith — faith’s relationship to Christ Himself, the propositional nature of Revelation in which we believe, the relation of πιστεύω (pisteuo, faith) and γινώσκω (ginosko-knowledge), the relational friendship of Christ and the Baptized — yet it is not clear that the layers of grace and the theological virtues are well understood if the questions of belief, knowledge, doctrine, evangelization (pre-election), and friendship with Christ (relational connotations) are all possible meanings of the single verb πιστεύω (pisteuo) in this one short book.30
It remains true, however, that the Gospel of John is itself explicit that πιστ- (pist-) terms — faith — are about acceptance of propositional truth. St. John the Apostle himself wrote, “these are written that you may believe (πιστεύητε/pisteuēte) that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name” (John 20:31 RSVCE)31 These words and sentences are written to be the proximate objects of faith in aid to the ultimate object — the Triune God!32 St. John could scarcely be clearer, especially in this line which defines the nature of his Gospel.33 This does not exclude a more relational connotation, however, since life in Christ’s name is a consequence of having this propositional faith, and He is the ultimate object of this same faith. However, that the Triune God remains the ultimate — and therefore proper — object of faith does not mean that the propositions of faith are unnecessary for humanity or that the consequences of having faith accrue to individuals without first having this faith.34 Father Serge-Thomas Bonino, OP wrote,
The faithful are those “who believe in me through their word” (Jn 17:20). Thus: “[B]elief comes in two ways. Sometimes by instruction from another; and this is the usual way. . . . Sometimes it comes by a divine revelation; and this is the special way.” The faithful believe, therefore, on the word of the apostles. St. Thomas dwells for some time on the objections raised against this universal mediation of the apostles. It is applied neither to the righteous of the Old Covenant nor, it seems, to those who, like St. Paul and the good thief, believed directly in the words of Christ himself, without passing through the apostles’ preaching. St. Thomas, however, distinguishes between the preaching of the apostles and its objective content: not only those who were taught by the apostles themselves (or their successors) have believed “through the words of the apostles,” but also those who believed though the “words of faith,” which is the objective content of the apostles’ preaching and which is called the word of the apostles “because they were especially (principaliter) commissioned to preach it” (Ioan. 17, 5, n. 2235).35
While the mode of receiving faith is multiple and the layers of consequences of faith are many, faith requires the truth content revealed to man by God propositionally. This is implied by the Lord Himself: “I do not pray for these only, but also for those who believe in me through their word, that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us, so that the world may believe (πιστεύῃ) that thou hast sent me” (John 17:20–21 RSV-CE).36
Since πιστ- (pist-) terms in the Gospel of John refer to trust and orientation in the propositional content variously revealed from God in a specifically Christian sense, but with a broad connotation of a personal relation between individuals and God and of the People of God’s relation to Him, we can quickly apply this understanding to an iconic section of John 8 read in the Mass in the 5th week of Lent.37
Jesus then said to the Jews who had believed in him (πεπιστευκότας αὐτῷ), “If you continue in my word (λόγῳ), you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth (γνώσεσθε), and the truth (ἀλήθειαν) will make you free.” “. . . I speak (λαλῶ) of what I have seen with my Father, and you do what you have heard (ἠκούσατε)from your father” (John 8:31–32; 38 RSVCE).
St. John begins this section by pointing out the audience for Christ’s initial words — those who already have faith in Him specifically — which is then made further precise by Christ’s own words. Not only do these disciples have faith in Him, but they have faith in Him — the Logos — in His very words (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ/en to logo to emo) as He has spoken them.38 These words do not only set up a relationship between Christ and His audience, as a relation of speaker to hearer, customary leader to followers, friends, or even as a trustworthy person. Rather, they denote truth in these words, which truth is empowered to make those who accept these truthful words in faith free from bondage — even from “their father” the devil. Therefore, this propositional faith is not “merely” intellectual but also overflows intimately into the disciples’ lives due to the reality understood by those propositions, Christ Jesus and His power.39 Yet the fact that these believed words, as the proximate object of faith in this passage, are γνώσεις (gnoseis) — truly knowledge — and ᾰ̓λήθειαι (alētheiai) — truth in an abstract sense (from the -ια/-ia suffix denoting abstract nouns) — should be enough evidence to maintain the principally propositional connotation of religious faith in this example from the Gospel of John.40 Thus, the Faithful must always trust in the specific content of the Faith, while trusting in the Revealer as well, in order to live the Christian life.
- See Francis Martin and William M. Wright, “Introduction,” in The Gospel of John, Catholic Commentary on Sacred Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), 15–26, 20; ibid, 25; See Thomas Aquinas, “Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura/Commentary on John,” Aquinas Online, accessed September 19, 2023, https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Ioan, C.8, L.4, §2568. ↩
- Such a notion, that faith is fundamentally a form of trust as opposed to a matter of truth, can be found in many places in contemporary thought and, therefore, deserves discussion. For examples, see Teresa Morgan, “Pisteuein and Its Relations in the Johannine Corpus,” chapter, in Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 393–443; Daniel Howard-Snyder and Daniel J. McKaughan, “Faith and Resilience,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91, no. 3 (January 8, 2022): 205–41, doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09820-z; 1. Daniel J. McKaughan and Daniel Howard-Snyder, “How Does Trust Relate to Faith?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52, no. 4 (May 2022): 411–27, doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.34. One Christian exegete, Christopher Seglenieks, has covered this issue, especially found in Morgan and other exegetical works, in order to temper this non-propositional position. See Christopher Seglenieks, “The Meaning of Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” in The Future of Gospels and Acts Research, ed. Peter G. Bolt, Center for Gospel and Acts Research Series (Sydney: SCD Press, 2021), 233–53. ↩
- Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “The Spiritual Basis and Ecclesial Identity of Theology,” essay, in The Nature and Mission of Theology: Approaches to Understanding Its Role in the Light of Present Controversy, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1995), 56. ↩
- See Francis Martin and William M. Wright, The Gospel of John, of Catholic Commentary on Sacred Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), 345–46; Jeffrey Kranz, “Word Counts for Every Book of the Bible,” OverviewBible, May 29, 2014, overviewbible.com/word-counts-books-of-bible/. ↩
- See Robert Beekes and Lucien van Beek, Etymological Dictionary of Greek, vol. 2, 2 vols., of Leiden Indo-European Etymological Dictionary Series (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1197.; ibid, 1161–1162; Rudolf Bultmann and Artur Weiser, “Πιστεύω, Πίστις, Πιστός, Πιστόω, Ἄπιστος, Ἀπιστεύω, Ἀπιστία, Ὀλιγόπιστος, Ὀλιγοπιστία,” essay, in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Volume VI: Πε-Ρ, ed. Gerhard Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 19681), 174–228, 175. ↩
- For the meaning of πιστός (pistos) and ἄπιστος (apistos) in this Gospel, see Christopher Seglenieks, “Thomas the (Un)Faithful: Πιστός in John 20.27,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 45, no. 2 (December 9, 2022): 135–56, doi.org/10.1177/0142064×221113926. This paper will not study these as separate from these other πιστ- (pist-) root words. ↩
- See James Strong, The New Strong’s Complete Dictionary of Bible Words (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1996), 682; ibid, 582. Individually, see 4100. πιστεύω, 4101. πιστικός, 4103. πιστός, and 571. ἄπιστος. ↩
- Note how this even goes into lexiconic use in Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, trans. William F. Arndt, F. Wilbur Gingrich, and Frederick W. Danker, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 639.; ibid, 662. For the antiquity of these words’ meanings being rooted in trustworthiness, see “Πιστεύω, Πίστις, Πιστός, Πιστόω, Ἄπιστος, Ἀπιστεύω, Ἀπιστία, Ὀλιγόπιστος, Ὀλιγοπιστία”, 175–79. For the common conceptual basis of these terms, see Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ”, 203–05. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 179. ↩
- See Seglenieks, “Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” 238. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ”, 179. ↩
- Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 8th ed. (New York, NY: American Book Company, 1897), 1008. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 182. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 180. See Seglenieks, “Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” 240. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 182. ↩
- Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” Aquinas Online, accessed October 19, 2023, https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, resp. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 183. ↩
- See Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 183. ↩
- See Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 183; ibid, 186–90. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 197. ↩
- Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 198. ↩
- See Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 199–200. For a more recent reiteration of the same, see Susan Haber, “God, Israel and Covenant: Unity in the Book of Deuteronomy,” European Judaism: A Journal for the New Europe 32, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 132–41, www.jstor.org/stable/41443452. ↩
- See Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 201. Furthermore, this relationship was primarily one of law — with less emphasis on personal faith (which is not to claim that this faith was not required in some way in the Old Testament understanding) — as then Fr. Joseph Ratzinger understood. For example, see Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. J.R. Foster and Michael J. Miller, 2nd ed., of Communio Books (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2004), 48–49. ↩
- For the need for such studies, see Seglenieks, “Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” 237. ↩
- See Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 205; ibid, 215. ↩
- Seglenieks, “Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” 234. Also see Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 203. It should be noted that “relational” in this current paper should be understood in a broad sense — perhaps broader than Seglenieks would wish — following the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of relations. Thus, concepts like “allegiance” would be considered categorically a kind of relation. See Seglenieks, “Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” 244. ↩
- See Joseph Ratzinger, “The Question of the Concept of Tradition: A Provisional Response,” essay, in God’s Word: Scripture — Tradition — Office, ed. Peter Hünermann and Thomas Söding, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2008), 41–89, 52; “Revelation has only arrived where, in addition to the material assertions witnessing to it, its inner reality has itself become effective after the manner of faith. Consequently, the person who receives it also is a part of the revelation to a certain degree, for without him it does not exist. . . . It is a living reality that requires a living person as the locus of its presence.” ↩
- See Ratzinger, “Spiritual Basis and Ecclesial Identity,” 61; “The Church, moreover, is not an abstract principle but a living subject possessing a concrete content. This subject is by nature greater than any individual person, indeed, than any single generation. Faith is always participation in a totality and, precisely in this way, conducts the believer to a new breadth of freedom. On the other hand, the Church is not an intangible spiritual realm in which everyone can pick what suits him. She is endowed with a concreteness rooted in the binding Word of faith.” Furthermore, see Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, q. 1, a. 2, resp. ↩
- Seglenieks, “Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” 239. ↩
- See Seglenieks, “Πιστεύω in the Gospel of John,” 240. For an extended example of the confusion possible in identifying a clear formal concept of Πιστεύω/πίστις (pisteuo/pistis), see Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 205–15. ↩
- Note St. Thomas focuses on the truth-contents of the Gospel elsewhere, Aquinas, “Commentary on John,” C.8, L.4, §2657–60. ↩
- See Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; ibid, II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2. ↩
- See Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ,” 223. ↩
- See what is said about the articles of faith in Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, q. 2, a. 7, resp. ↩
- Serge-Thomas Bonino, “The Role of the Apostles in the Communication of Revelation According to the Lectura Super Ioannem of St. Thomas Aquinas,” essay, in Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 318–46, 324–325. See Bultmann and Weiser, “Πιστεύω, κτλ”, 222. ↩
- This propositional understanding of faith comes out very well when Christ Jesus speaks of His relationship to His Father, both here at 17:20–21 and elsewhere, and has the virtue of not cutting faith off from the lived relationship of man to God. Thus, “The act of reception of revelation in which the reality of Christ is appropriated to us is called, in the language of the Bible, ‘faith.’ On this basis, we can perhaps understand more clearly how it is that for the New Testament faith means the same as the indwelling of Christ.” Ratzinger, “Question of the Concept of Tradition,” 57. True indwelling illuminates what Ratzinger wrote earlier in the same section, “The reality that comes to be in Christian revelation is nothing and no other than Christ himself. He is revelation in the proper sense: ‘He who has seen me has seen the Father,’ Christ says in John (14:9)”; Ratzinger, “Question of the Concept of Tradition, 56. ↩
- “Wednesday of the Fifth Week of Lent,” United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, accessed October 19, 2023, bible.usccb.org/bible/readings/032923.cfm. ↩
- See Aquinas, “Commentary on John,” §1195. ↩
- See Martin and Wright, The Gospel of John, 160–61; Aquinas, “Commentary on John,” C.8, L.4, §1197. ↩
- F. Blass and A. Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, trans. Robert W. Funk (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 59-60. Note that gnosis does not inherently imply a hidden knowledge, as in Gnosticism, nor does “abstract” truth here necessitate speculative universals in a high philosophical sense. However, the latter is not lexicographically excluded. See Aquinas, “Commentary on John,” C.8, L.4, §1198. ↩
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